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NOTES

Japan's East China Sea Ocean
Boundaries: What Solutions Can a
Confused Legal Environment Provide in
a Complex Boundary Dispute?
ABSTRACT

This Note addresses the ocean boundary delimitation conflict between
Japan, China, Taiwan, and South Korea in the East China Sea. The
author considers international law on boundary delimitation and concludes that the law is unclear on delimitations between states within four
hundred nautical miles of one another. The InternationalCourt ofJustice has held that equity is the norm to be applied to boundary delimitation disputes but it has not resolved the competition between the natural
prolongation theory of delimitation and a theory based upon the Exclusive Economic Zone. The geology of the East China Sea brings this issue
to the fore. The author concludes that regardless of how this conflict is
resolved, equidistance,proportionality,and other equitable concerns will
apply to any boundary delimitation. The Note accounts for the political
situation in the East China Sea area and concludes that the possibility of
reaching a solution is greater than it has been in the past. The author
nevertheless argues that it will be necessary to look to alternatives to existing legal precedents to develop a solution to the dispute in the East
China Sea. These alternatives include the creation of joint development
zones, a compromise of the best legal position advanced by each side and
an approach based on strict proportionality.
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INTRODUCTION

Japan, as an island nation, is inextricably bound to the surrounding
sea. Historically, the sea has provided Japan with a rich source of fish, a
defense from the rest of the world, and a route for a booming export
trade." Since the late 1960s, possible oil reserves in the East China Sea
have generated hopes of partial resource independence for this natural
resource-poor country; as a result, Japan's interest in the sea floor has
heightened. 2 Unfortunately for Japan, a complex boundary dispute involving China, South Korea, and Taiwan locks these oil reserves from its
use.

1. See C. PARK, EAST ASIA AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 6, 59-64 (1983) (describing
fishery relations between Japan and Korea and alluding to Japan's isolationism under
the Tokugawa Shogunate).
2.

See generally C. PARK, supra note 1. "The East China Sea is thought to contain

10 to 100 billion barrels of oil .... ." Valencia, Northeast Asia: Petroleum Potential,
JurisdictionalClaims, and InternationalRelations, 20 OCEAN DEv. & INT'L L. 35, 48

(1989). "The Sea of Japan and the East China Sea are also favorable loci of deposition
of submarine metallic sulfides including copper, zinc, lead, nickel, cobalt, manganese,
iron, gold, and silver associated with faults and spreading zones. Potential economic geothermal zones extend [throughout the region]." Id. at 44.
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Illustration I
Source: C. PARK, EAST ASIA AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 3 (1983). The illustration shows the location
of the Okinawa Trough and the small islands. The shaded area indicates possible oil reserves.

This Note will describe the geographic and geomorphologic condition
of the East China Sea in order to characterize the situation for analysis
according to international law relating to ocean boundaries. Next, this
Note will analyze the current state of international law on maritime border delimitation. Specifically, this Note will focus on the three seminal
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opposite coast delimitation cases to determine how an international adjudicatory body might delimit the East China Sea boundaries. The Note
will consider the role of political tension3 surrounding the earlier cases to
compare and contrast that tension to the tension surrounding Japan's
situation. Last, this Note will consider alternative solutions for resolving
the dispute.
This Note will conclude that the East China Sea conflict may be characterized as a conflict between opposite states and solved under the corresponding analysis, but that another solution may lie in viewing Japan's
Ryukyu island chain as outlying islands rather than as part of the Japanese mainland.4 Of prime importance in the conflict between the states
involved, which are less than four hundred nautical miles apart, is the
Okinawa Trough-a geomorphologic expression of the plate tectonics of
the region. This trough lies closer to Japan than to its neighbors. 5 If the
Okinawa Trough is treated as marking the edge of the continental shelf'
of Japan, Japan could lose access to the natural resources of the shelf
beyond. The treatment of such features, however, is uncertain-especially in light of such circumstances as surround the East
China Sea debate.
This Note finds that international law relating to ocean boundary delimitation is not completely developed. The guiding principle is "equity,"
but the meaning of this principle is not highly evolved. Variables that
one must consider when applying this principle to the instant matter
include 1) the uncertain basis of claims within two hundred nautical
miles of Japan; 2) the uncertain treatment of the uninhabited islands
near Japan on the far side of the Okinawa Trough; 3) the uncertain
status of the Ryukyu Islands south of the large islands of Japan; 4) the
uncertain treatment to be given the Okinawa Trough; and 5) the role of
other factors such as economics and prior use.
The geopolitical situation in the region has traditionally made submission 9f regional disputes to an adjudicatory body an unlikely means of
dispute resolution. In recent years, however, the states have progressed
toward mutual dispute resolution and more open relations, including the
3. The states of the region are diverse. As one author noted, they "are all states with
politically and economically differentiated systems." Nakauchi, Problems of Delimitation
in the East China Sea and the Sea of Japan, 6 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 305, 305
(1979).

4. Outlying islands may be treated differently than a mainland state for purposes of
boundary delimitation. See infra note 129 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 11-13 and accompanying illustration and text.
6. See Illustration 7 infra p. 592.
7. See infra notes 187-93 and accompanying text.

19891

EAST CHINA SEA BOUNDARY DISPUTE

establishment of joint economic zones in two areas. Additionally, states
outside the region have demonstrated that adjudication and other alternative means of dispute resolution can successfully be used between ideologically different governments. Also, commentators have suggested negotiated solutions that show potential for success. Nonetheless, observers
must temper optimism with the wisdom given by an historical perspective of the region, especially in light of recent political events in China.8
II.

GEOGRAPHY AND GEOMORPHOLOGY

The East China Sea boundary dispute involves a continental state, a
peninsular state, and two island states.9 Japan is located less than four
hundred miles from its neighbors across the southern Sea of Japan,
across the Korean Strait, and throughout the East China Sea.' ° It disputes the oceanic boundary between itself and each of these neighbors.
The Okinawa Trough cuts through the East China Sea." In the Korean Strait, resolution of the boundary conflict depends partly on the
treatment of two small islands-Danjo Gunto and Tori Shima-in a
boundary delimitation. Both islands lie on the Korean side of the Okinawa Trough. These islands increase the amount of, and help justify
Japan's claims to, the continental shelf on the Korean side of the
2

Trough.1

8. See infra note 198.
9. China is a coastal state; South Korea is at the tip of the Korean Peninsula, and
Japan and Taiwan are both island states.
10. See C. PARK, supra note 1, at 246. All the seas off China are "studded with so

many offshore and mid-ocean islands that nowhere in the three seas does the distance
from one headland or island to another approach 400 miles." Id.

11. See id. at 27.
12. Id. at 24. "The Japanese Government would not hesitate to take the [Danjo
Gunto island] issue to the International Court of Justice, but South Korea has persistently refused. Japan also proposes to settle the issue through an exchange of notes in
accord with the treaty on the peaceful settlement of disputes between the two governments. South Korea argues, however, that the issue cannot be settled by bilateral agreement." Nakauchi, supra note 3, at 312.

586

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol 22:581

Illustration 2
Source: C. PARK, EAST ASIA AND THE LAw OF THE SEA 25 (1983). The illustration shows the location
of the Okinawa Trough and the location of the Senkakus and Danjo Gunto Islands. Tori Shima is
north of Danjo Gunto. See Illustration 1 supra p. 583.

In the southern Ryukyu island chain

4

near Taiwan, there is currently

13.

C. PARK, supra note 1, at 25.

14.

The Ryukyus have been a part of Japan since they were returned by the United
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a dispute over ownership of other small islands-the Senkakus-which
also lie on the side of the Okinawa Trough farthest from Japan.15 The
Ryukyus themselves are small compared to the four main islands of Japan; but like the four larger islands, the Ryukyus support life and
civilization.16

Illustration 3

Adapted from:

NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC, ATLAS OF THE WORLD 191

States in 1971. Id. at 34.
15. Id. at 32-33.
16. See Illustration 3.

(5th ed. 1981)
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The Japanese land mass is an island arc system resulting from a subduction zone; that is, the oceanic crust is being subducted beneath the
continental plate upon which China sits on the Pacific Ocean side of the
islands. The island arc was formed over the subducting plate and, in
back of the arc, a spreading back-arc basin system formed the Japan
Basin and Okinawa Trough.17

Illustration 4
Source: J. KENNET, MARINE GEOLOGY 359, 371 (1982). The illustration demonstrates the tectonics
of the Okinawa Trough and the tectonic activity in the region.

17.

See J. KENNETT, MARINE GEOLOGY 370-71 (1982).
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The Okinawa Trough reaches depths greater than two thousand meters"8 and is therefore much deeper than continental shelves which extend between one and three hundred meters below sea level and shallower than the ocean floor which generally plunges between three and
19
six thousand meters.
lO00s
of meters

continental shelf

Ryukyus

sea level

1
2
3

4

Okinawa
Trough
oean floor

6
7

Ryukyu Trench

subducting plate
Illustration 5
Adapted from: THE TIMEs ATLAS OF THE OCEANS 17 (A. Couper ed. 1983) and J. KENNETT,
MARINE GEOLOGY 27 (1982).

18. THE TiMES ATLAS OF THE OCEANS 20 (A. Couper ed. 1983) [hereinafter TiMES
ATLAS].
19. See J. KENNETT, supra note 17, at 27-37. "Most of the East China Sea has
water of depths less than 200 m[eters]" throughout the shelf area-an exploitable depth.
Valencia, supra note 2, at 42. For a synopsis of the geology of the region and the implications for oil exploration, see id.
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The Okinawa Trough lies closer to Japan than to the other disputant
states and lies completely within two hundred nautical miles of the Ryukyu Islands, 20 giving rise to the claim that Japan's ocean rights are re2
stricted by the Trough. 1

Illustration 6
Source: C. PARK, EAST ASIA AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 247 (1983).

20. See Illustration I supra p. 583.
21. See C. PARK, supra note 1, at 116. For a contrasting argument, see THE LAW
OF THE SEA: PROBLEMS FROM THE EAST ASIAN PERSPECTIVE 82-83 (C. Park & S.
Park eds. 1987) [hereinafter EAST ASIAN PERSPECTIVE] (statement of Akio Suda, Legal
Affairs section of the Treaty Bureau of Japanese Foreign Ministry).
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III.

THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT

History reveals an evolution in the law of maritime boundary delimitation. The modern notion of the freedom of the high seas is the product
of an historical struggle between those states that favored an open sea
(mare liberum) and those states that hoped to appropriate the ocean to
their exclusive use (mare clausum).22 The press to close the seas abated
somewhat after the pre-eminence of the British Navy, however, and
states began to claim a right only to the relatively small area of the sea
that they could control off their shores.2 3 States began to assert claims to
the ocean shelf after President Truman issued a proclamation that the
United States held legal title to the continental shelf off its shores. 24
Thus, the most recent round of claims to offshore territorial sovereignty
were rooted in geology. One writer warns, however, that "it is not possible to devise any legal formula that take[s] into account all the vagaries
of geology. '' 25 Although the selection of geology as a basis for determining maritime boundaries seems natural, it has produced considerable
difficulties.
Following the issuance of the Truman Proclamation, the International
Law Commission codified the emergent continental shelf regime in the
22. See I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 238 (3d ed.
1979). The opening of the high seas is attributed to the ascendancy of the British Navy,
as Sellar and Yeatman observe in a popular send-up of British history:
Alfred noticed that the Danes had very long ships, so he built a great many more
much longer ones, thus cleverly founding the British Navy. From that time onwards foreigners, who, unlike the English, do not prefer to fight against long odds,
seldom attacked the British Navy. Hence the important International Law called
the Rule Britannia, technically known as the Freedom of the Seas.
W. SELLAR & R. YEATMAN, 1066 AND ALL THAT 11 (1931). This struggle continues
today-with less ferocity perhaps but with the same fervor. A. HOLLICK, U.S. FOREIGN
POLICY AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 5-6 (1981) ("In the 20th century, the tension between pressures for enclosure and for maritime freedom has continued.... In the second
half of the 20th century the tide has turned substantially in favor of the forces for
enclosure.").
23. I. BROWNLIE, supra note 23, at 238. The area that nations could control was
about three miles or the distance of a cannon shot. A. HOLLICK, supra note 22, at 5.
24. Policy of the United States with Respect to the Natural Resources of the Subsoil
and the Sea Bed of the Continental Shelf, Proclamation No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,303
(1945), reprinted in L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACTER & H. SMIT, INTERNATIONAL
LAW 1299-1300 (2d ed. 1987) [hereinafter HENKIN]; see also R. CHURCHILL & A.
LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 110 (1985) ("It is customary to regard the proclamation
made by President Truman of the USA in 1945 as the first clear assertion of the idea
that a continental shelf belongs to the coastal State.").
25. Jain, ContinentalShelf-Some Geological Aspects, INDIAN J. INT'L L. 564, 579
(1972).
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1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf (Continental Shelf
Convention). 26 The Continental Shelf Convention acknowledged sovereign rights in coastal states over their continental shelves for the purpose
of exploration and exploitation. 2 Broadly speaking, the continental shelf
is the natural prolongation of the land offshore from the littoral state
that drops at a gradual angle to the more steeply breaking continental
slope.
Ocean Space Definitions

Z:
'"
.J

1WATER

011
,7

CONTINENTAL SHELF

COLUMN

:SLOPE:

CONTINENTAL MARGIN

RISE
-

DEEP
OCEAN FLOOR

Illustration 7
Source: A.

HOLLICK, U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 7 (1981).

The Convention also provided that when, absent special circumstances,
the claims to the continental shelf of adjacent or opposite states overlap
and the states cannot agree among themselves on the boundary, the states
shall divide the shelf based on the principle of equidistance. 8
The International Court of Justice (I.C.J.) validated the theory of
"natural prolongation" of a state's sovereignty
from the land to the continental shelf in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases.2" The Court
held:
[Tjhe rights of the coastal State in respect of the area of continental shelf
26. Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, opened for signature Apr. 29,
1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311 [hereinafter Continental

Shelf Convention].
27.

28.

Id. art. 2(l).

Id. art. 6(l)-(2). "Equidistant lines" are those lines that are everywhere "equally

distant" from both states' baselines. In the case of two opposite coasts the equidistant line

is in the "middle" of the sea between them. Id.
29.

North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (W. Ger. v. Den./W. Ger. v. Neth.), 1969

I.C.J. 3, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 340 (1969).
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that constitutes a natural prolongation of its land territory into and under
the sea exist . . . as an extension of [the land] in an exercise of sovereign

rights for the purpose of exploring the seabed and exploiting its natural
30
resources.
The Court, however, did not find that the equidistance-special circumstances rule of dispute resolution is part of customary international
law."' Rather, it found that boundary divisions in international law are
based upon "equitable principles."3 2
When the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS III)"8 convened, the parties "had great difficulty in finding
an acceptable provision concerning delimitation." 4 This difficulty
stemmed in part from a newly-emerged basis for claims to the continental shelf known as the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The EEZ concept validates claims to economic uses of the seafloor within two hundred
nautical miles of a coast regardless of the shape of the ocean floor.35 The
concept grew from dissatisfaction with the results of the existing continental shelf regime and from the desire for more certain access to the
continental shelf.3 6 The success of this re-emergence of mare clausum
thinking derived largely from the efforts of several Latin American
states, that convinced underdeveloped states of the need to fence off the
sea to frustrate the desire of developed states for broad oceanic
37
influence.
Today, "there are .. .two legal bases [namely, EEZ and "natural

prolongation" theory] for coastal State rights in relation to the sea
bed."3 8 The Convention adopted at UNCLOS III, the Law of the Sea

30. Id. at 2, 8 I.L.M. at 357.
31. Id. at 41, 8 I.L.M. at 373; see R.

CHURCHILL & A. LOWE, supra note 24, at
116; Cook, Filling the Gap-Delimitingthe Australia-IndonesiaMaritime Boundary,
10 AUSTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 131, 138 (1987); Lee, Troubles under the Water: Sino-Japanese Conflict of Sovereignty on the Continental Shelf in the East China Sea, 18 OCEAN

DEv. & INT'L L. 585, 592 (1987) ("The equidistance method does not possess an inherent quality as a legal norm for delimitation.").
32. 1969 I.C.J. at 53, 8 I.L.M. at 384.
33. UNCLOS III ultimately produced the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122, reprinted
in 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982) [hereinafter LOSC].
34. R. CHURCHILL & A. LOWE, supra note 24, at 117.
35. Id. at 125; see also Charney, The Delimitation of Ocean Boundaries, 18 OCEAN
DEv. & INT'L L. 497, 520 (1987).
36. Cf A. HOLLICK, supra note 22, at 9.
37. The result, ironically, has favored developed and richer developing nations. See
id. at 170-71.
38. R. CHURCHILL & A. LOWE, supra note 24, at 111.
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Convention (LOSO), embodied these alternate and conflicting bases
,without resolving the conflict between them. 9 The failure to resolve the
conflict creates problems when state claims predicated upon each theory
overlap. For example, in the East China Sea dispute, China claims the
broad shelf off its coast on the basis of natural prolongation theory,
whereas Japan hopes to divide the shelf with a median line in order to
obtain title to the sea-bed. °
It is unclear under existing international law whether a state's claim
to the ocean floor within two hundred nautical miles of its coast is properly based on natural prolongation or EEZ theory. This uncertainty
adds confusion to the process of ocean floor division between states that
are less than four hundred nautical miles apart.4 '
IV.

SUMMARY OF THE BOUNDARY

DISPUTE

The development of the law on ocean boundaries and the geography
of the East China Sea have combined to produce a situation of overlapping claims to that area.42 China, Korea, and Taiwan claim that Japan
has no legal right to the ocean floor beyond the Okinawa Trough and,
consequently, no right to share in the oil and other oceanic resources of
the sea-bed there.4 These states assert that the Trough naturally divides

39. Article 83(1) states:
The delimitation of the continental shelf between States with opposite or adjacent
coasts shall be effected by agreement on the basis of international law, as referred
to in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, in order to
achieve an equitable solution.

LOSC, supra note 33, art. 83(1). Article 76(1) provides:
The continental shelf of a coastal State comprises the sea-bed and subsoil of the
submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a
distance of 200 nautical miles ... where the outer edge of the continental margin
does not extend up to that distance.
Id. art. 76(1). Article 55 establishes the EEZ, and article 57 provides that the EEZ may
extend up to two hundred nautical miles. Id. arts. 55, 57. The interplay of these articles
allows one to read either that the EEZ provision applies only when the continental shelf
is less than two hundred nautical miles wide, or that the continental shelf provision
applies only when the shelf is wider than two hundred nautical miles. See Lee, supra
note 31, at 588-89 (sketching the conflict at UNCLOS III); Reid, Petroleum Development in Areas of International Seabed Boundary Disputes-Meansfor Resolution,
1985 AUSTL. MINING & PETROLEUM Y.B. 544, 547.
40. Lee, supra note 31, at 592-95; Valencia, supra note 2, at 44, 55.
41. Cf infra notes 208-217 and accompanying text.
42. See Illustration 11 infra p. 611.
43. See C. PARK, supra note 1, at 6-13. But see infra note 151.
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the ocean floor between them. Japan claims that the Trough does not
legally split the sea-bed and, alternatively, that the geomorphologicallyblind EEZ regime, not the continental shelf regime, governs the sea-bed
within two hundred nautical miles of a state. If neither of these Japanese
claims are valid, Japan asserts that it nevertheless has territory on the
far side of the Okinawa Trough in the form of two small sets of islands,
giving it rights to the shelf beyond the Trough."" Adding to the confusion
is the uncertainty whether the states should treat the Ryukyu island
chain as outlying islands or as part of the four large islands of Japan; if
deemed outlying islands, the Ryukyu chain may command less ocean
floor.4 5

Beyond these disputes in interpretation of international law and regional geomorphology, political disputes, such as the governance of Taiwan, and a number of other non-adjudicatory options compound the situation.4 6 Moreover, the region has never resolved its differences
peacefully. 47 There has been progress, however, in ocean boundary dispute resolution, and opportunities exist for resolving the situation in the
East China Sea.
Japan's boundary disputes in the potentially oil-rich seas to its West
revolve primarily around the following four major physical and legal
contentions: 1) the effect to be given the small islands, Danjo Gunto and
Tori Shima, that lie on the Korean side of the Okinawa Trough; 2) the
ownership of and effect to be given to the Senkaku islands near Taiwan,
that also lie on the far side of the Trough; 3) the effect to be given the
Ryukyu Islands that continue the arc of Japan's four main islands; and
4) the effect of the Okinawa Trough itself on Japan's claim to territorial
sovereignty over the shelf beyond the Trough, given the proximity of the
coasts in the East China Sea.4 8 There are also complicating political factors arising from the Chinese view of the region.49 Finally, adjudication

44. See Lee, supra note 31, at 597-98.
45. See infra notes 222-26 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 125-28 and
accompanying text.
46. See infra Part VI, section B.
47. See infra note 177.
48. One commentator asserts that most of the boundary disputes in the region "are
concerned with the ownership of islands." Valencia, supra note 2, at 46. While islands
are involved in most of the disputes and complicate the issues, I would put more emphasis on the Okinawa Trough because the islands are relatively small and detached from
any state, and therefore will probably not weigh heavily in the mind of a boundarydrawer.
49. See infra Part VI. Briefly, these complications are: 1) China claims rights to all
of the shelf beyond the Okinawa Trough on the basis of the "natural prolongation"
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is not the only, nor necessarily the primary, option for resolving this
dispute.50
V. THE ANGLO-FRENCH, GULF OF MAINE, AND LIBYA-MALTA
PRECEDENTS

The three most recent and relevant contentious cases regarding opposite coast border delimitation decided by international adjudicatory bodies are the Anglo-French arbitration,51 the Gulf of Maine case, 2 and the
Libya-Malta case. 3 These will be discussed in turn.
A. The Anglo-French Arbitration
The Anglo-French arbitration is important for understanding the legal situation in the East China Sea because it deals with opposite coasts,
the role of median line principles in equitable delimitation, and the effect
given to dependent islands. In this case, the United Kingdom and France
agreed in principle to lay out a boundary in the English Channel between them, but they did not agree to all the particulars.5 4 Specifically,
they could not agree on how to treat the populated Channel Islands, that
belong to Britain but lie close to the French coast.5 5 Neither could they
agree on the effect to be given two small sets of islands off the coast of
each state. 6

theory; 2) China and Taiwan both claim to represent the Chinese people; and 3) China
refuses to negotiate with South Korea because it does not recognize South Korea as a
state. See infra notes 150, 175-76 and accompanying text.
50. See Valencia, supra note 2, at 56-58 (setting forth a number of options for dispute resolution).
51. Case Concerning the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf (U.K. v. Fr.), 18
R.I.A.A. 3 (1978), reprinted in 18 LL.M. 397 (1979).
52. Case Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine
Area (Can. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 246, reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1197 (1984).
53. Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 13, reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 1189 (1985).
54. 18 R.I.A.A. at 5, 18 I.L.M. at 400.
55. See Illustration 8 infra p. 597.
56. Id.

1989]

EAST CHINA SEA BOUNDARY DISPUTE

Illustration 8
Source: 18 R.I.A.A. 3, 338 (1978), 18 I.L.M. 397, 494 (1979).

Because the two states were unable to negotiate a solution, they agreed
to submit their dispute to binding arbitration.57
In reaching its decision, the Court of Arbitration selected by the parties had to determine the applicable law. The Court found that the
United Kingdom had ratified the Continental Shelf Convention." France
had also ratified the Convention, but had made reservations that the
United Kingdom rejected. 59 Consequently, the Court found that customary international law applied by default in all areas that the French
reservations were intended to affect, and that the Continental Shelf Convention applied to all other areas of dispute.6 0 Nonetheless, the Court
found that "the rules of customary law lead to much the same result as
the provisions" of the Continental Shelf Convention. 1
The "same result" the Court referred to was the achievement of equity that it found mandated by the reasoning of the I.C.J. in the North

57. Id. at 4-5, 18 I.L.M. at 399-400.
58. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
59. 18 R.I.A.A. 27-40, 18 I.L.M. at 412-18.
60. Id. at 42, 18 I.L.M. at 419.
61. Id. at 44, 18 I.L.M. at 420. This opinion was echoed by Judge Oda in his
dissent in Libya-Malta in which he argued the primacy of the equidistance-special circumstances rule. 1985 I.C.J. 13, 144-45, 24 I.L.M. 1189, 1255 (1985). It is not unreasonable, however, to assume that the Continental Shelf regime had a greater effect in this
case than in later cases.

598

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VoL 22.581

Sea Continental Shelf Cases and by the Convention. 2 The Court specifically found the "equidistance-special circumstances" method worked
equity and was especially applicable to cases involving opposite coasts.6 3
Acknowledging that in customary international law the rule of equidistance-special circumstances has no obligatory effect, the Court agreed
with the parties that, in principle, the Court should apply this method to
the instant case because the parties were opposite states and the Convention and the I.C.J. interpretations of customary international law supported application of that method. 6
The Court proceeded to consider what effect to give the Channel Islands and the Atlantic islands; it found that both sets of islands had to be
treated specially to avoid inequity. 6 5 The Court employed the principle
of "proportionality" in considering whether it would be equitable to include the Channel Islands in the baseline of the United Kingdom.6 6
Finding the coastlines roughly equal, the Court determined that it would
be inequitable to account directly for the Channel Islands and instead
drew a median line through the English Channel that ignored the islands altogether.6 7 Recognizing, however, that the Channel Islands were
densely populated and entitled to some territorial sea, the Court drew a
twelve mile enclave enclosing the Islands' territorial fishing regions to
the north and northwest.6
In the case of the islands off the states' Atlantic coasts, the Court
found that a strict median line would again produce an inequitable distorting effect and accordingly adjusted the line to take less account of the
British islands that protruded west.6 9
Another important aspect of the Anglo-French arbitration that relates

62. "[T]he Court was led to conclude that in customary law the basic principle of
delimitation is that, failing agreement, the boundary must be determined in accordance
with equitable principles." 18 R.I.A.A. at 50, 18 I.L.M. at 423. "[T]he combined 'equidistance-special circumstances rule' [of the Convention], in effect, gives particular expression to a general norm that, failing agreement, the boundary between States abutting on
the same continental shelf is to be determined on equitable principles." Id. at 45, 18
I.L.M. at 421.
63. Id. at 51, 18 I.L.M. at 424.
64. Id. at 52-53, 18 I.L.M. at 424-25.
65. Id. at 93, 18 I.L.M. at 443-44.
66. Id. at 93-94, 18 I.L.M. at 444. "Proportionality" is a label for the comparison
between the extent of the continental shelf areas appertaining to the coastal State and the
length of its coast. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (W. Ger. v. Den./W. Ger. v.
Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 4, 54.
67. 18 R.I.A.A. at 93-94, 18 I.L.M. at 444.
68. Id. at 95-96, 18 I.L.M. at 444-45.
69. Id. at 96-97, 18 I.L.M. at 455.
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to Japan's situation is that the Court discounted any effect of the Hurd
Deep, a trough and fault zone that runs on the French side of the median line from near the Atlantic to the Channel Islands.

Illustration 9
Source: Merrills, The United Kingdom-France ContinentalShelf Arbitration, 10 CAL. W. INT'L

L.J. 314, 315 (1980).

The Court held that the Hurd Deep, with a depth no greater than two
hundred meters,"0 was not significant enough to warrant a finding that it
was a shelf discontinuity."' The Court also indicated it would be anomalous to allow the United Kingdom to make a claim based on the Hurd

70. See TIMES ATLAS, supra note 18, at 17.
71. 18 R.I.A.A. at 60-61, 18 I.L.M. at 428. The definitional issue raised by the term
"shelf discontinuity" is discussed below. See infra notes 156-66 and accompanying text.

600

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol 22.581

Deep since the United Kingdom had forgone a claim on the two hundred
meter deep 72 Norwegian Trough when dividing the North Sea between
itself and Norway by treaty.7 3 The Court suggested that taking account
of the Hurd Deep "would run counter to the whole tendency of State
practice on the continental shelf in recent years." 4
B. The Gulf of Maine Case
The Gulf of Maine case came to a chamber of the I.C.J. by way of a
Special Agreement" between Canada and the United States. This
Agreement requested a final and binding determination of a single line
dividing the continental shelf and superadjacent waters between the
United States and Canada.7 ' The Court agreed to accept some limits on
the line it could draw under the principle that an agreement of the parties should first determine the ocean boundary delimitation.7 The Court
also noted that this case, unlike those it had previously considered, required that a line actually be drawn instead of merely indicated, and
that this line relate not only to the shelf but also to the exclusive fishing
zone.7 The Gulf of Maine case is pertinent to this Note's inquiry because 1) the Court characterized the area as primarily about opposite
coasts with the special feature that the water column was being delimited
in addition to the continental shelf; 2) the Court considered the question
of geomorphologic discontinuity; 3) the Court considered the effect of
dependent islands; and 4) the Court considered the role of other fac-

72. See C. PARK, supra note 1, at 29; TIMES ATLAS, supra note 18, at 17; see infra
notes 153-55.
73. 18 R.I.A.A. at 60, 18 I.L.M. at 428; see also Millard, The Legal Environment
of the British Oil Industry, 18 TULSA L.J. 394, 401-402 (1983) (explaining the Norwegian Trough situation).
74. 18 R.I.A.A. at 60, 18 I.L.M. at 428.
75. The Special Agreement is annexed to the Treaty between the Government of the
United States of America and the Government of Canada to Submit to a Chamber of the

International Court of Justice the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of
Maine Area, March 29, 1979, 33 U.S.T. 2797, T.I.A.S. No. 10204, reprinted in 20
I.L.M. 1378 (1981). This Note will refer to this I.C.J. Chamber as the "Court."
76.

Case Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine

Area (Can. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 246, 263-64, reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1206 (1984).
77.

Id. at 266, 23 I.L.M. at 1207.

78.

Id. at 267, 23 I.L.M. at 1208. The parties to the Anglo-French arbitration also

required that the Court of Arbitration actually draw a dividing line. Case Concerning

the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf (U.K. v. Fr.), 18 R.I.A.A. 3, 5 (1978), reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 397, 400 (1979).
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tors.7 9 The case was decided by a margin of four to one. s°
The applicable law in this case, as in the others, was general international law." l The Court considered customary international law and concluded that the governing norm "is ultimately that delimitation, whether
effected by direct agreement or by the decision of a third party, must be
based on the application of equitable criteria and the use of practical
methods capable of ensuring an equitable result." 2
The Court discounted the geologic factor because the parties agreed
that the continental shelf in the region is essentially continuous geologically.8 3 The United States, however, made a geomorphologic argument
that the Northeast Channel, which lies near Nova Scotia, is a "special
feature" that the Court ought to consider in its delimitation. 4

Illustration 10
Source: 1984 I.C.J. 246, 269, 23 I.L.M. 1197, 1209 (1984).

79. 1984 I.C.J. at 331, 326-27, 336-37, 341-44, 23 I.L.M. at 1240, 1237-38, 124243, 1245-46.
80. Schwebel, J., wrote a separate opinion and Gros, J., dissented.
81. 1984 I.C.J. at 288, 23 I.L.M. at 1218.
82. Id. at 300, 24 I.L.M. at 1224.
83. Id. at 273, 24 I.L.M. at 1211.
84. Id. at 259, 23 I.L.M. at 1204. Geomorphology is a branch of geology that emphasizes landforms.
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The Court looked at the treatment of -the Hurd Deep in the AngloFrench arbitration and found that, geomorphologically, the Northeast
Channel was even less significant and should not be considered.8, The
Court said that the "Northeast Channel ... does not have the characteristics of a real trough marking the dividing-line between two geomorphologically distinct units." ' While not committing itself beyond the facts of
the case before it, the Court found that the Gulf of Maine situation was
"different from the situation that may prevail in areas where a natural
separation does exist from the factual viewpoint. '87 Later the Court
noted recognition by the United States that the channel was not a "geological fault which would make it possible to ascribe to it ... the function of a natural boundary between distinct areas of sea-bed." 8 The
Court divided the overlapping area equally, partly because the Court
concluded that this was not "a concrete situation where distinctive geological characteristics can be observed in the continental shelf, such as
might have special effect in determining the division of that shelf and the
resources of its subsoil."8 9 The Court seemed to indicate that some geomorphologic discontinuity may be sufficient to divide a continental shelf
but that none existed in the instant case.
Like the panel in the Anglo-French arbitration, the Court in the Gulf
of Maine case gave only half effect to small dependent islands in calculating the relative proportionality between the coasts.f °
The Court compared the ratio of coastline lengths between the United
States and Canada and found that the United States coastline was somewhat longer. Based on this difference and ignoring the small dependent
islands, the Court determined the ratio was 1.38 to 1.91 Therefore, the
Court shifted the line toward Nova Scotia and away from
Massachusetts. 2
The parties also raised arguments based upon historical use,9 3 eco-

85. Id. at 274, 23 I.L.M. at 1211.
86, Id.
87. Id. at 275, 23 I.L.M. at 1212 (emphasis added).
88. Id. at 276, 23 I.L.M. at 1212.
89. Id. at 327, 23 I.L.M. at 1238. In other words, a sufficient geologic discontinuity
did not support the geomorphologic discontinuity. The Court also considered the effect of
dependent islands, proportionality, and other factors discussed below. See infra Part V,
section D.
90. 1984 I.C.J. at 336-37, 23 I.L.M. at 1242-43.
91. Id. at 336, 23 I.L.M. at 1242.
92. Id. at 336-37, 23 I.L.M. at 1242-43.
93. Id. at 340-41, 23 I.L.M. at 1244-45.
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nomic dependence,94 natural fish stock groupings,95 the broad directions
of the coastlines,9 6 and activity in the area showing responsibility and
perhaps acquiescence. 97 The Court rejected these arguments, declaring
that if it applied the method of equal division based on coastal geography
and adjusted on considerations of proportionality of coastline length and
special effects of some geographic phenomenon, such as islands and protrusions, these other arguments were inappropriate or inapplicable.9"
The Court did, however, refer to these criteria to assess the equity of the
line that it finally drew.99
C. The Libya-Malta Case
The Libya-Malta case came before the I.C.J. by special agreement
between Libya and Malta.' 0 0 Libya and Malta, which are within four
hundred miles of one another, could not agree on how to draw a boundary between them to divide the potentially oil-rich sea-bed.10 1 The Court
rendered judgment by the margin of fourteen to three.' 0 2
Libya-Malta dealt with a number of issues applicable to the East
China Sea dispute. The Court addressed the issues of geology and the
continental shelf, the rules of delimitation, the relative importance of
equidistance and proportionality, the shelf area an island may be accorded, and the effect given some miscellaneous factors.
The Court found that, according to the agreement of the parties, customary international law governed.' 0 3 Only Malta had acceded to the
Continental Shelf Convention, and, although both countries had joined
the LOSC, this latter Convention was not yet in force.' 4 While this fact
need not prevent the LOSC from being referred to as evidence of international law, the LOSC may not stand as international law without the

94. Id. at 341, 23 I.L.M. at 1245.
95. Id. at 276, 23 I.L.M. at 1212.
96. Id. at 258, 23 I.L.M. at 1203.
97. Id. at 259, 310, 23 I.L.M. at 1204, 1229.
98. Id. at 326-28, 341-42, 23 I.L.M. at 1237-38, 1245; see also Schneider, The Gulf
of Maine Case: The Nature of an Equitable Result, 79 A.J.I.L. 539, 571, 573 (1985).
99. 1984 I.C.J. at 246, 340-44, 23 I.L.M. at 1197, 1244-46.
100. Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 13, 1517, reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 1189, 1190-91 (1985).
101. R. ST. JOHN, QADDHAFI'S WORLD DESIGN 88 (1987).
102. 1985 I.C.J. at 56, 24 I.L.M. at 1211.
103. Id. at 29, 24 1.L.M. at 1197.
104. The LOSC has not yet received the sixty signatures required before it enters
into force. See LOSC, supra note 33, art. 308.

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

[VoL. 22.581

support of state practice and opinio juris.'05 Nonetheless, the Court
found that it could look to the LOSC as evidence of customary international law, 106 although the Court did not point out the Convention's basis in state practice and opinio juris.'l 7
The Court agreed with the parties and found, as did the arbitral tribunal in the Anglo-French arbitration, that the area should be delimited
in accordance with equitable principles to achieve an equitable result.1 0 '
A similar position was also reached in the Gulf of Maine case.'09
While the parties agreed on the applicable law, they disagreed on the
legal basis of title to the continental shelf and sea-bed. Libya proposed
that the legal basis of title rested on the theory of natural prolongation of
a state's continental shelf-a geomorphologic fact. Malta, on the other
hand, argued that the concept of natural prolongation had been modified
so that geomorphology was a relevant consideration only after claims
within two hundred nautical miles of a state's coast were recognized."'
Malta's argument centered on the recognition in the LOSC of the
EEZ."' The argument was significant because closer to Malta than
Libya are a series of deep troughs reaching depths in excess of one thousand meters that Libya argued were a "rift zone."" 2 Libya, therefore,
argued that the troughs were the natural boundary between two distinct
continental shelves.'
The Court found it proper to ignore the "rift
zone" and stated:

105. See generally HENKIN, supra note 24, at 37 ("[T]he definition of custom comprises two distinct elements (1) 'general practice' and (2) its acceptance as law."); Char-

ney, InternationalAgreements and the Development of Customary InternationalLaw,
61 WASH. L. REV. 971 (1986).
106. 1985 I.C.J. at 29, 24 I.L.M. at 1197.
107. See Charney, supra note 105, at 995. Professor Charney notes that the I.C.J. in
Libya-Malta mentioned the importance of finding state practice and opinio juris, but
reached its conclusion without doing so explicitly. He suggests that this could reduce the
I.C.J. statement about the relevance of the LOSC to the status of obiter dictum. Id.

108.

1985 I.C.J. at 30-31, 24 I.L.M. at 1198.

109. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
110. 1985 I.C.J. at 31-32, 24 I.L.M. at 1198-99; see supra note 39.
111. Id. at 32, 24 I.L.M. at 1199. The EEZ concept is found in article 76 of the
LOSC and gives each sovereign state territorial rights over the sea-bed up to two hundred miles from its coast. LOSC, supra note 33, art. 76; see R. CHURCHILL & A. LOWE,
supra note 24, at 124-47. Churchill and Lowe report that by 1982, fifty-five states had
independently claimed two hundred mile EEZs. Id. at 126; see supra note 35 and accompanying text (describing the EEZ concept).
112. A "rift zone" is an area where new crust is created in the gap between continental plates that are moving apart. See J. KENNETr, supra note 17, at 329.
113. 1985 I.C.J. at 34, 24 I.L.M. at 1200.
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The Court... considers that since the development of the law enables a
State to claim that the continental shelf appertaining to it extends up to as
far as 200 miles from its coast, whatever the geological characteristics of
the corresponding sea-bed and subsoil, there is no reason to ascribe any
role to geological or geophysicalfactors within that distance either in verifying the legal title of the States concerned or in proceeding to a delimitation as between their claims. 14

In addition, the Court found that it would have been too difficult to
determine whether the discontinuity represented by the troughs was "so
scientifically 'fundamental,' that it must also be a discontinuity of a natural prolongation in the legal sense."

'

16

Despite the Court's agreement with Malta on the insignificance of geologic features within two hundred nautical miles, the Court found that
the EEZ concept did not mandate use of equidistance in reaching an
equitable solution. 116 Instead the Court looked to the following factors:
(1) the general configuration of the coasts of the Parties, their oppositeness, and their relationship to each other within the general geographical
context;
(2) the disparity in the lengths of the relevant coasts of the Parties and the
distance between them;
(3) the need to avoid in the delimitation any excessive disproportion between the extent of the continental shelf areas appertaining to the coastal
State and the length of the relevant part of its coast . ..."
The Court found that the starting point for drawing an equitable line
in the case of opposite states was an equidistant line." 8 After drawing
this line between Libya and Malta, the Court moved the line back toward Malta because it found that Libya's coastline was much longer." 9
114. Id. at 35, 24 I.L.M. at 1200 (emphasis added).
115. Id. at 36, 24 I.L.M. at 1201. This supports the sentiment alluded to earlier that
it is impossible to account for all the vagaries of geology in a legal formula. Jain, supra
note 25, at 579.
116. 1985 I.C.J. at 37, 24 I.L.M. at 1201.
117. Id. at 57, 24 I.L.M. at 1211.
118. Id. at 46-47, 24 I.L.M. at 1206. The Court denied any implication that it must
start with an equidistance line and noted that such a requirement failed in UNCLOS
III. Id. at 37, 24 I.L.M. at 1201. In the case of opposite states, however, the Court found
equidistance the most judicious starting point, in accord with the North Sea Continental
Shelf Cases. Id. at 46-47, 24 I.L.M. at 1206.
119. Id. at 52-56, 24 I.L.M. at 1209-11. The Court used a rather loose procedure
for adjusting the line, that Judge Oda objected to in his dissent. Id. at 133, 24 I.L.M. at
1249 (Oda, J., dissenting). The Court first found the median line between Sicily and
Italy, setting this as the farthest the boundary could be adjusted. Then the Court compared the coast of Malta facing Libya to the Libyan coast between Tunisia and the
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The Court, without revealing any specifics, indicated that there may
be an analytical difference between dependent islands, such as the Channel Islands of the Anglo-French arbitration, and island states. x20 The
Court stated only that "[t]his aspect of the matter is related not solely to
the circumstances of Malta being a group of islands, and an independent
State, but also to the position of the islands in the wider geographical
context, particularly their position in a semi-enclosed sea." ' When the
Court considered how equity mandated movement of the line, it relied on
the fact that the islands of Malta are a "relatively small feature in a
semi-enclosed sea" and there is a difference in coastline length.1 2 The
Court moved the dividing line north toward Malta on the basis of these
factors. In his dissent, Judge Oda charged that these considerations were
not appropriate in changing the Malta-Libya median line and gave that
line "short shrift. ' 1 3 He contended that the Court merely adjusted the
line to reflect a division of the sea between Italy and Libya and noted
that the line that the Court drew, admittedly imprecisely, just happened
1 24
to line up perfectly with the southernmost Italian claims in the area.
Judge Oda argued that the majority in Libya-Malta incorrectly applied the "partial effect" doctrine that the Court of Arbitration applied
to islands in the Anglo-French arbitration. Whereas in the AngloFrench arbitration the islands were a small distorting portion of a larger
territory, Libya-Malta involved a whole state.125 Regardless of whether
Judge Oda is correct in his accusations, the Court's decision, by accounting for proportionality of coastlines in its delimitation rather than bisecting lines radially connecting the two coasts, limited the amount of shelf
an island state like Malta can claim. 26 Nonetheless, the Court measured the Maltese coast by measuring its facing baseline rather than its

mouth of the Gulf of Sidre. Noting that there was a significant discrepancy between the
two, the Court moved the line toward Malta, selecting "around three-quarters" as equitable. Id. at 51-52, 24 I.L.M. at 1208-1209.
120.

Id. at 42, 24 I.L.M. at 1204.

121.

Id.

122.

Id. at 52, 24 I.L.M. at 1209.

123.

Id. at 139, 24 I.L.M. at 1252 (Oda, J., dissenting).

124. Id.
125.

Id.

126. Query whether the Court would have applied this same method of proportionality in a case similar to the one diagrammed below.
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actual facing coastline."' This suggests that island arc systems, like that
of Japan, may be less threatened by the use of proportionality because

[_A

IB

-1
I

I

C

In this illustration, Malta can be seen as country A with a relatively small coastline.
Country B would correspond to Libya and country C to a mythical third state with a
very long baseline. The Court's arguments suggest that C should have a larger area than
B which in turn should get more ocean bed than A. In this situation, Judge Oda's
method of connecting baselines and halving them, as illustrated below, seems to make
more sense. In the above case, his method would result in an equidistant line.
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1985 I.C.J. at 171, 24 I.L.M. at 1268-1269.

127. A "baseline" is a line connecting certain projections of a coastline that are determined by formula for the purpose of measuring sea claims. LOSC, supra note 33, art.
7. By "actual" coastline, this author intends to point out that, in the case of islands, one
must connect points of land separated by water. Thus, the resulting line is much longer
than the cumulative length of the land along the islands' coast. See id. art. 47 (archipelagic baselines).
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their facing baselines cover very large areas.""
The last issue arising in Libya-Malta that may be applicable to the
East China Sea dispute is the issue of uninhabited islands. The Court
refused to consider several uninhabited islands off the coast of Malta in
delimiting the shelf.1 2 This decision suggests that small uninhabited
islands will not significantly help a country extend the area of its territory and foreshadows a difficulty that Japan may face in its arguments
based on the uninhabited Danjo Gunto and Senkaku island groups near
Taiwan.
D.

Summary of the Precedents

All three of these boundary delimitation cases between opposite states
were decided primarily on the basis of customary international law. The
adjudicatory body in each case agreed that equity was the rule applicable
to the delimitation of sea-bed boundaries. Equity, however, is not clearly
defined in any of the cases and appears to be context specific.
In the Anglo-French arbitration, the Court invoked equity to uphold a
median line division between the opposite coasts and to modify the seaward projection of the line in order not to favor small dependent islands
as the situation came more to resemble adjacent states. Fairly large
populated islands within the English Channel were denied effect to avoid
the inequity of depriving France of use of the English Channel. The
Court found that the opposite nature of the states led to application of a
median line as an expression of equity. In both Gulf of Maine and
Libya-Malta, equity was used to modify the median line to account for
lack of proportionality between coastal lengths.
Proportionality was considered in all three cases. In the Anglo-French
arbitration and Gulf of Maine, the courts gave small dependent islands
less effect in the overall boundary delimitation. The Anglo-French Court
failed to give fairly large populated islands effect, yet in Gulf of Maine,
the Court gave Nova Scotia full effect, 30 suggesting that treatment of

128. But see Y.

MA, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF THE SEABED BOUNDARY DELIMITATION

EAST CHINA SEA 163-64 (University of Maryland School of Law, Occasional
Papers/Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian Studies No. 3-1984 (62), 1984) (arguing
that the principle of proportionality should apply to move the dividing line toward
Japan).
129. 1985 I.C.J. at 48, 24 I.L.M. at 1207.
130. Telephone interview with Professor Jonathan I. Charney, Vanderbilt University School of Law (July 3, 1989) [hereinafter Charney Interview]. Professor Charney
was an expert assistant to the Legal Advisor of the United States Department of State in
IN THE

the Gulf of Maine case.
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islands varies. In Libya-Malta, uninhabited islands received no effect,
and Malta itself arguably suffered by being an island.
In none of the cases was a geomorphologic discontinuity found controlling. However, in Gulf of Maine, the Court appeared to reserve
judgment on whether such a situation could occur in another context.' 3 1
Other considerations appeared unimportant in the initial boundary delimitation.13 2 As stated above, the LOSC codified the principle that parties should agree, but when agreement is not possible a tribunal should
use equitable principles to reach an equitable delimitation.
In sum, the following is true regarding boundary delimitation between
opposite states separated by less than four hundred nautical miles:
A. Boundary delimitation will be influenced by
(1) equitable considerations;
(2) proportionality between coastlines;
(3) populated dependent islands to a varying degree depending on size and location.
B. Boundary delimitation will not be influenced by the presence of
uninhabited dependent islands.
C. Boundary delimitation may be influenced by:
(1) median line principles initially;
(2) the presence of geomorphologic features;
(3) other factors to the extent that they allow the adjudicator
to check the equitable nature of the division;
(4) the island nature of the state.'

131. The deeps considered reach two hundred meters in the case of the Hurd Deep;
over one thousand meters in the rift zone off Libya; and over two hundred meters in the
Gulf of Maine. See Case Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the
Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 264, 276, reprintedin 23 I.L.M. 1206,
1212.
132. Dr. Ying-jeou Ma, an East China Sea scholar, concluded that claims of defense
and security interests, navigation interests, historical title interests, unity of deposits interests, and fishing and EEZ interests would all be irrelevant in the East China Sea. Y.
MA, supra note 128, at 127-32. Additionally, Dr. Ma classified the Ryukyus as a partially relevant circumstance that may not generate "full entitlement in a shelf boundary
delimitation." Id. at 132-33.
133. Compare Cook, supra note 31, at 157 with Lee, supra note 31, at 590. Lee
finds three relevant factors:
(1) the configuration of the coastlines of the parties; (2) the geological and physical
structure, and natural resources of the continental shelf area involved; and (3) a
reasonable degree of proportionality between the extent of the continental shelf
areas appertaining to the coastal state and the length of its coast measured in the
general direction of the coastline.
Id.; cf. Charney, supra note 35, at 520 ("Non-geographic factors may be almost com-
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JAPAN AND THE EAST CHINA SEA-BED

Application of the Anglo-French, Gulf of Maine, and LibyaMalta Cases

The Anglo-French, Gulf ofMaine, and Libya-Malta decisions provide
distinct guidance for a tribunal in any suit to settle the boundaries between Japan and its neighbors. Regardless of whether the dispute is ever
submitted to the I.C.J., or otherwise resolved in accordance with international law, it is inevitable that international legal principles will affect
the way in which the merits of the controversy are argued and
1 34
resolved.
Three states in the region-China, South Korea, and Japan-have
ratified the LOSC,1 35 although that Convention is not yet in force. Taiwan has not ratified the LOSC 38 The older Continenfal Shelf Convention is also inapplicable to this dispute.1 3 ' Therefore, customary international law governs any boundary disputes between Japan and its
neighbors. 38
Japan has granted oil concessions on the continental shelf in the East
China Sea that conflict with claims and concessions made by one or more
of the three other above-named states.

pletely irrelevant in all cases of boundary delimitations within 200 nautical miles from
the coastline.").
134. C. PARK, supra note 1, at 19.
135. OFFICE OF OCEAN AFFAIRS AND THE LAW OF THE SEA, PUB. No. 11, LAW OF
THE SEA BULLETIN

1-5 (1988); Ma, The East Asian Seabed Controversy Revisited:

Relevance (or Irrelevance) of the Tiao-Yu-T'ai (Senkaku) Islands TerritorialDispute, 2
CHINESE Y.B. INT'L L. & AFF. 1, 5 (1982).
136. Ma, supra note 135, at 26.
137. While Taiwan is party to this treaty, China, Japan, and Korea are not. U.S.
DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 94-33; I. KAVASS & A. SPRUDZS, TREATIES IN FORCE 325
(1988); see Lee, supra note 31, at 588.
138. See Lee, supra note 31, at 588 (discussing the development of international law
on boundary delimitations in relation to the East China Sea).
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Illustration 11

Source: C. PARK, EAST AND THE LAW OF THE SEA, 348 (1983). The illustration shows the overlapping
claims of the region.

Two of these concessions conflict with claims and concessions made by
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both China and Taiwan; one conflicts only slightly with claims made by
Korea; and the last conflicts with claims made by all three other
states.'13 This last area was the subject of a Japanese-Korean joint-development agreement in 1974.140 The Chinese protested immediately
after the agreement was made, and Japan balked before finally ratifying
4
the document.1 '

The overlap in claims between Japan and Korea in the Korean Straits
area is perhaps the simplest to resolve.'1 2 The oil concessions made by
each state appear to reflect a median line principle and only overlap
slightly. 143 It is likely that a tribunal would find that the parties already
implicitly accept a median line principle, even if they do not do so expressly in their submission to the tribunal's jurisdiction. Any tribunal
would likely proceed to draw such a line.
In contrast, the disputes in the East China Sea are intense and not
4
easily resolved. Claims there depend partly on title to the islands.1
The Danjo Gunto and Senkaku islands, which lie on the far side of the
Okinawa Trough from Japan, help establish Japan's legitimacy as a
claimant to the shelf. The islands, however, are uninhabited and nearly
useless.'" The I.C.J. undercut the effectiveness of a successful claim by
Japan to these islands when it failed to account for similarly' useless
uninhabited islands in the Libya-Malta case. 146 Likewise, the LOSC
provides that "[r]ocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or conti139. See Illustration 11 supra p. 611.
140. C. PARK, supra note 1, at 115.
141. Id. at 116-17, 133-34.
142. Id. at 23; see also Nakauchi, supra note 3, at 312 ("Delimitation based on the
principle of equidistance would not put [North Korea, South Korea, and Japan] in an
exceptionally disadvantageous position from the standpoint of sharing living and nonliving resources in the Sea of Japan.").
143. C. PARK, supra note 1, at 23.
144. The islands are "not really appropriate for habitation" and are primarily valuable "only in relation to the possibly tremendous offshore oil reserves around them."
Nakauchi, supra note 3, at 312-313. Nakauchi writes:
It is hard to believe that the supposed median line ... on the Chinese side would
be unconditionally accepted by China or that Japan would accept the same line on
the Japanese side. It does not seem fair or equitable that the Senkaku Islands be
used as a base point for delimiting the continental shelf, thus giving rise to the title
to the oil reserves and the respective shares of economic benefits.
Id. at 313.
145. Ma, supra note 135, at 6-8. Although small, these peaks of underwater mountains protrude as high as 383 meters and can be used for navigation. Id. at 8.
146. Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 13, 48,
reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 1189, 1207 (1985).
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nental shelf."' 47 Thus, even if Japan successfully claims title to these
islands, this fact will not appreciably advance its claims to the continental shelf. 14 8 Nonetheless, the Danjo Gunto and Senkaku Islands may
still legitimize Japan's claim that an EEZ extending from the Ryukyu
Islands should include the continental shelf on the far side of the Okinawa Trough.
The general treatment of islands raises questions about how the populated but small Ryukyus will be treated. The Ryukyus are smaller than

the Channel Islands of the Anglo-French arbitration. Since the Channel
Islands were not given effect in the general division of the English Channel, the Ryukyus arguably should not be given effect. The Ryukyus are
different, however, because they continue along the geographic line of
the larger Japanese islands and appear much more integrated to the
state than do the Channel Islands. 4
As was the dispute in Libya-Malta, the dispute over the East China
Sea is framed in terms of different interpretations of the origin of the
title to ownership. Like Libya in Libya-Malta, China, Korea, and Taiwan base their claims on natural prolongation theory.'
These states
take the position that the Okinawa Trough marks the end of the continental shelf and presents a natural barrier that Japan's claims cannot
cross. 5 ' Some Japanese scholars, predictably, feel that a median line

147. LOSC, supra note 33, art. 121(3); see Ma, supra note 135, at 28-30 (discussion of the ambiguity surrounding the interpretation of the meaning of inhabitability).
Dr. Ma describes the Senkakus and concludes that they should not be granted a continental shelf or an EEZ. Id. at 42-44; see also Chao, East China Sea: Boundary

Problems Relating to the Tiao-Yu-T'ai Islands, 2

CHINESE

Y.B.

INT'L

L. & AFF. 45,

96.
148. See Nakauchi, supra note 3, at 313-14 (arguing that claims to the islands only
destroy settlement prospects); Valencia, supra note 2, at 57 (arguing that the Senkakus
should have no effect on the boundary delimitation).
149. See infra notes 222-26 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 125-28,
and infra note 172 and accompanying text.
150. C. PARK, supra note 1, at 27-28.
151. Id.; see Chiu, Some Problems Concerning the Application of the Maritime
Boundary Delimitation Provisions of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea Between Adjacent or Opposite States, 9 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 1, 14
(1985). Chiu writes:
[W]hen the Republic of China made a declaration on its economic zone on September 6, 1979, it specifically pointed out:
The sovereign rights enjoyed by the Republic of China over the continental
shelf contiguous to its coast as recognized by the Convention on the Continental Shelf of 1958 and the general principles of international law shall
not be prejudiced in any manner by the proclamation of the present exclusive economic zone or the establishment of such zones by any other state.
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principle should resolve boundary disputes between opposite states.1'5
The only early guidance for treatment of the Okinawa Trough is the
treaty between Great Britain and Norway that disregarded the Norwegian Trough in its delimitation of the North Sea.'
Dr. Choon-ho Park
notes, however, that there are great differences between the Norwegian
and Okinawan troughs.'
Although Dr. Park does not seriously consider the geological differences, he notes that one significant difference is
depth.' 5 5
Geologically, the Okinawa Trough marks a spreading zone associated
with the subduction of a plate,' whereas the Norwegian Trough cuts a
region of continental shelf subsidence resulting from the opening of the
Atlantic and is likely the result of glaciation.' 5 7 In Gulf of Maine,, the
I.C.J. seemed to reserve the issue of whether the Court is required to
recognize geologic discontinuity in boundary delimitation.' 5 8 Tectonic
discontinuity, the most severe geologic discontinuity, is the most likely
feature to serve as a boundary limit if any such discontinuity is deemed a
sufficient divider.' 5 Yet, the Libya-Malta decision ignored one thousand
meter deeps 6 0 (about half the depth of the Okinawa Trough) within
two hundred nautical miles of the coast."6 This holding helps legitimize

Id.; see also Yuan, The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea from a Chinese Perspective, 19 TEX. INT'L L.J. 415, 431 n.71 (1984). Yuan observes:
China adheres to the following principles in shelf delimitations with its neighboring countries:
1. application of the concept of natural prolongation;
2. delimitation through consultation;
3. consultations shall be conducted on equitable principles, taking account of all
the relevant circumstances.
Id. (citing a speech by Wang Tieya of Beijing University).
152. Lee, supra note 31, at 595.
153. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
154: C. PARK, supra note 1, at 29.
155. Id. at 29-30 (The Norwegian Trough is about two hundred meters deep,
whereas the Okinawa Trough runs from two hundred meters to two thousand meters in
depth.).
156. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying illustration and text.
157. See E. SHEPARD & R. DILL, SUBMARINE CANYONS AND OTHER SEA VALLEYS

289, 293-94 (1966); see also V.
FLOOR 12 (1984).

LiTvlN, THE MORPHOSTRUCTURE OF THE OCEAN

158. Case Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine
Area (Can. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 246, 275, reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1197, 1212 (1984).
159. See Cook, supra note 31, at 150-51.
160. These deeps are the physical manifestation of a spreading zone-also a tectonic
feature resulting from a plate boundary. See supra note 112.
161. Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 13, 34-
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Japan's claim that the Okinawa Trough should not be a consideration in
delimiting the continental shelf within two hundred nautical miles of the
Japanese coast. The Japanese can now point to a tectonicly related geomorphologic feature of similar size that did not terminate claims over the
far continental shelf.
The Libya-Malta case apparently contradicts the Gulf of Maine case
by suggesting that no discontinuity is sufficient to serve as a boundary
limit. While the Court in Gulf of Maine hinted at some other sufficient
discontinuity, in Libya-Malta the Court found insufficient a rift zone,
which marks plate boundaries and is as significant a discontinuity as
nature provides. judge Oda questioned the majority position in LibyaMalta that customary international law had developed to the point of
disregarding geologic factors within the two hundred nautical mile zone
off a state's coast.1 6 2 He wrote that the majority's position "would have
been open to challenge, had the sea-bed in the ...

case featured, not a

rift zone, but the outer edge of a continental margin."16' 3 judge Oda
would limit the effect of geologic factors to that specific instance when a
continental shelf drops off to the deep sea.'" Additionally, he argued
that the EEZ regime has superceded the theory of natural prolongation
within two hundred nautical miles of a coastline."" The Court must
decide what judge Oda correctly points out as inconsistent: whether the
continental shelf regime is superseded within two hundred nautical miles
or whether the idea of "sufficient discontinuity" has any meaning. This
issue is crucial to the East China Sea area. The geology of the region
shows that Japan is separated from the continental shelf. The Okinawa
Trough is a spreading zone that marks a continuing separation of the
Ryukyus from China and is classified as a "mature" trough. 68 Distinction of the Okinawa Trough leaves very few situations that might satisfy
the discontinuity principle.
In the case of opposite states, both the Anglo-French and the LibyaMalta cases found that the median line was the best starting point for
reaching an equitable solution in the case of opposite states."8 If judge

35, reprintedin 24 I.L.M. 1189, 1200 (1985).

162. 1985 I.C.J. at 157, 24 I.L.M. at 1261 (Oda, J., dissenting).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. Islands do not have continental shelves and yet may possess an EEZ. LOSC
article 121(2) provides: "[The exclusive economic zone ... of an island [is] determined
in accordance with the provisions of this Convention applicable to other land territory."
LOSC, supra note 33, art. 121(2).
166. J. KENNETT, supra note 17, at 371.
167. See supra Part V, section D.
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Oda's position prevails and the equidistance-special circumstances
method becomes the preferred method of boundary delimitation-with
equity serving to modify the initial results-there is yet a further question: would a modification of the equidistance principle take account of
the Okinawa Trough as an equitable consideration? In the AngloFrench decision, the Court found that the outlying islands of the United
Kingdom inequitably distorted the median line as it ran into the Atlantic. In Libya-Malta, the Court found that the relative proportions of the
two opposite coastlines made a strict median line inequitable. 168 While
the Ryukyu island chain is, conceivably, a group of outlying islands, they
are certainly different from the outlying islands in the Anglo-French
case. In the Anglo-French arbitration, the line drawn extended to water
beyond the islands and was not limited to water between the islands.
Even if, as it seems in Libya-Malta, proportionality inherently counts
against island states, 16 1 Japan arguably is not affected since the coastline
is traditionally measured along the baseline.'
Japan's baseline extends
in an even arc parallel to the outward edge of the Asian continent and
bears nearly a one-to-one proportion with the Chinese coastline. This
approach is generally consistent with treatment of archipelagic states
under the LOSC."' Professor Cook, analyzing a similar situation between opposite states with a dividing trough off the coast of Australia,
concludes that the outcome of an international adjudication is presently
uncertain, but he believes that such an adjudication would probably
favor an equidistant division.17 2
Although the result of adjudication is unclear, the evolution of boundary delimitation cases suggests that initially a tribunal would divide the
East China Sea along a median line due to the opposite nature of the
states. The line would probably be moved toward Japan because of the
Okinawa Trough and because the southern reaches of Japan are composed of smaller islands. This result is not certain, however, since an
adjudicatory body could reasonably find either that the Trough divides
the sea floor, or that the Ryukyus should be given full effect.

168. Id.
169. See supra notes 120-28 and accompanying text.
170. Dr. Park predicted this result in 1975. C. PARK, supra note 1, at 112-113; see
also EAST ASIAN PERSPECTIVE, supra note 21, at 291.
171.

See LOSC, supra note 33, arts. 47 (baselines), 48 (measurement of continental

shelf and EEZ).

172. Cook, supra note 31, at 166-75. Professor Cook finds that "the EEZ will probably prevail in cases of overlap with the continental shelf." Id. at 166.

1989]

EAST CHINA SEA BOUNDARY DISPUTE

CHINA

~. ';

Nv

-

Senkakus

o

500
Miles
median line

(Ryukyus get full effect)
adjusted line

(accounting for trough
and proportionality)
SOkinawa

Trough Line

Illustration 12

B.

Political Considerations Preceding Resolution of the Boundary
Dispute in the East China Sea

While it is possible to predict the outcome of boundary dispute resolution by an international tribunal with varying degrees of certainty, the
prediction does not answer whether that method of dispute resolution is
feasible. To predict whether Japan and its neighbors can resolve their
boundary dispute as Libya and Malta or the United Kingdom and
France have done requires analysis of the similarities and differences in
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the political situations of these separate cases.
Dr. Park, in a series of essays, set out the intricacies of the political
dynamic that has halted progress in resolving the boundary dispute in
the East China Sea. He identifies several characteristics of the region: 1)
all the states involved except China are oil importers; 17 3 2) China's ocean
boundary claims are unspecific;17 4 3) China and Taiwan both claim to
represent the Chinese people; 17 5 4) China does not recognize separate
Korean governments;' 7 6 5) the region has a history of solving disputes
with force;' 7 6) resolution of claims in the East China Sea may adversely affect China's interest in other areas along its coasts.' 7 8
The three oil-hungry neighbors have already attempted jointly to develop the shelf off their coasts. In 1970, the three came to an agreement
for joint shelf development that was nevertheless thwarted by Chinese
claims, asserted for the first time, to the same shelf area.'7 9 Because all
of the parties took the Chinese threats seriously, all activity essentially
stopped for a time. 8 0 Then, in 1972, Japan and Korea drew up an
agreement for joint development that both states subsequently ratified,

173. C. PARK, supra note 1, at 4-6, 307.
174. EAST ASIAN PERSPECTIVE, supra note 21, at 281.
175. C. PARK, supra note 1, at 10-12; see also Lee, supra note 31, at 586 ("[Tjhe
Beijing government will not negotiate with the Taipei government unless Taiwan is willing to become an autonomous province of the People's Republic of China ...

."). Tai-

wan in turn has threatened to cut its trade with Japan should Tokyo and Beijing ever
reach a compromise that threatens Taipei's claims to the sea-bed. Valencia, supra note 2,
at 54. Taipei's position appears to be having the intended effect despite Japan's announcement in 1972 that it would only settle the dispute in this area with China. Id. at

47.
176. EAST ASIAN PERSPECTIVE, supra note 21, at 292; see also Lee, supra note 31,
at 586 (China will not negotiate "with South Korea, because North Korea is recognized
by the P.R.C. as the only legitimate government in Korea."); Valencia, supra note 2, at

56, 58.
177. EAST ASIAN PERSPECTIVE, supra note 21, at 295; see also Valencia, supra
note 2, at 50 ("Northeast Asia contains probably the most deeply divided regional pattern of state relations in the world."). But see Lee, supra note 31, at 595 ("[I]ncreasing
economic ties together with appreciation of the value of the bilateral diplomatic relationship between China and Japan since 1970 indicate that .resort to armed force is not
anticipated.").
178. EAST ASIAN PERSPECTIVE, supra note 21, at 256. Apparently this political
dynamic even obtains to the natural prolongation theory that is so important to China in
the East China Sea, but which would work to its disadvantage in its boundary disputes
with Vietnam. Id. at 258.
179. C. PARK, supra note 1, at 130-31.
180. Id. at 133; see also Valencia, supra note 2, at 54 (The parties included the
United States, which told its oil companies they were on their own in the region.).
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although Japan waited six years to do so.' 1 China has disputed this
agreement since its inception." 2 Dr. Park suggests that Japan was slow
to ratify in part because of China's protest but more probably because of
a perception that the ocean regime was swinging back toward a medianline principle." 3 Despite its concerns, Japan did ratify and subsequently unsuccessfully pursued the possibility of a similar joint development with China in the presumably oils rich Senkaku island area in
1979.8 In addition, Japan is a recent partner in the development of the
Yellow Sea between China and Korea.185 Thus, these states are moving
together on the resource issue, an issue that is closely tied to the concept
of sea-bed jurisdiction. Despite Dr. Park's early pessimism, he now suggests that at some point the pressure will become too great for China to
hold up resolution of this dispute-if China does not act, it may be left
186
out.
Even if the states of the East China Sea began to solve their disputes
over resources in the sea, would they honor a tribunal's edict on boundary delimitation? Historically, China has discounted international law as
a tool of the bourgeois capitalist states.'8
Nonetheless, "China has
taken a 'pick and choose' attitude toward some of the judicial decisions of
the [I.C.J.],"'' " choosing those that emphasize natural prolongation and

181. C. PARK, supra note 1, at 133-34. Korea ratified the agreement in 1974 and
Japan ratified the agreement in 1978. Japan's official explanation for accepting the joint
development zone, which lies entirely on the Japanese side of the median line, is as
follows:
(1) the continental shelf in the joint development zone is considered as part of the
natural prolongation of mainland China and Korea; (2) the recent LOS Conference had a tendency to strengthen the theory of the natural prolongation of the
continental shelf... ; and (3) the establishment of such a joint development zone,
therefore, is neither unfavorable nor disadvantageous to Japan.
Nakauchi, supra note 3, at 313.
182. Valencia, supra note 2, at 47.
183. EAST ASIAN PERSPECTIVE, supra note 21, at 292.
184. That attempt failed when China reportedly "responded affirmatively, on the
condition that the joint attempt would in no way affect its stand on the territorial issue."
Id. at 295 (emphasis added); Valencia, supra note 2, at 55; cf. Lee, supra note 31, at
600; Cheng, China's JapanPolicy in the 1980s, 61 INT'L AFF. 91, 105 (1984-85).
185. Richardson, Jan Mayen in Perspective, 82 A.J.I.L. 443, 451 (1988).
186. EAST ASIAN PERSPECTIVE, supra note 21, at 296. Note also that export of
crude and refined oil products made up twenty to twenty-five percent of China's exports
over the last four years. Valencia, supra note 2, at 52.
187. Yuan, supra note 151, at 423. The attitude described is still prevalent today.
Id. at 426-47.
188. Id. at 426.
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promote China's self interest. 89 As to the political feasibility that the
states might submit to a tribunal's authority, the Anglo-French and Gulf
of Maine cases provide poor analogies because the states involved in
these disputes have a history of co-operation that is lacking among the
states of the East China Sea.
The Libya-Malta case, nevertheless, suggests that states with little in
common can successfully use international adjudication. Relations between Libya and Malta are historically tense, Malta having once served
as a base for threatening British and NATO forces.19
Relations between the two states ameliorated somewhat after the base was removed.
One author observes:
Albeit not without controversy, diplomatic relations between Libya and
Malta were generally cordial over the next few years [after the base was
removed]. In 1976, for example, the two states agreed to refer an offshore
oil dispute to the International Court of Justice .

. .

. As in a similar

dispute with Tunisia, the question of offshore oil rights with Malta was
an extremely sensitive one for Libya. Both disputes involved potential new
oil discoveries likely to become operational in the 1990s, when Libya's
onshore production would begin to decline.' 9'
The Libya-Malta case shows that dispute resolution by an international tribunal provides an alternative for politically delicate situations.
Advantages of submission to the I.C.J. include an opportunity for leaders to shift the blame for the result; a chance to depoliticize the issue;
and an opportunity to encourage the growth of international legal order
in the region.1 92 There are, however, serious drawbacks to submission;
these include the loss of control; the risk of national humility in a region
sensitive to such special consequences; and the danger to China in pro-

189. Id. Professor Yuan translated a 1957 article from the Chinese People's Daily
newspaper which exemplifies this attitude:
International law is one of the instruments for settling international problems. If
this instrument is useful to our country, to the socialist cause, or to the cause of
peace of the people of the world, we will use it. However, if this instrument is
disadvantageous to our country, to the socialist cause, or to the cause of peace of
the people of the world, we will not use it and should create a new instrument to
replace it.
Id. at 428 (quoting Chu, Refute Chen Tichiang's Absurd Theory Concerning International Law, People's Daily, Sept. 18, 1957). This is consistent with China's efforts to
delete article 309 from the LOSC so that reservations to the Convention would be allowed. See Lee, supra note 31, at 593.
190. R. ST. JOHN, supra note 101, at 87.
191. Id. at 88.
192. Lee, supra note 31, at 596.
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moting what it sees as an inherently flawed international legal order.'9 3
C. Alternative Solutions
This author would add one more factor to Dr. Park's region-defining
characteristics-China's new openness to foreign investment and to the
joint development zone."" Park notes that China historically used a
policy of strict self-reliance that foreclosed foreign help in development of
oil reserves.' 95 The recent consideration of a joint development zone"9 6
and the change in China's position on self-reliance suggest that resolution of the boundary disputes of the region is not as chimerical as it once
was. Joint development is attractive because, as commentator Elliott
Richardson observed in the context of the Jan Mayen conciliation, it
"minimiz[es] the potential for conflict, often by eliminating competition
over the ownership of the resources .... It converts the otherwise intractable issue of ownership into a question of distribution and of quantity..
. .)-17 Finally, Japanese-Chinese cooperation in the Yellow Sea and Soviet-United States co-operation in the Berents Sea are evidence that po-

193. Id. at 597. Valencia writes:
In the context of the great economic and political movements in Northeast Asia,
maritime issues are a relatively minor affair. However, some maritime issues may
be so crucially situated in time or substance vis-a-vis the balance of much greater
issues that they could have a significant impact on political relations in the region.
Disputes over islands or boundaries in areas of great petroleum potential may be
such issues.
Valencia, supra note 2, at 52.
194. See, e.g., Yuejiao, A Brief Introduction to Recent Laws and Regulations Concerning the Absorption of Foreign Direct Investment in the People's Republic of China,
4 CHINA L. REP.125. China apparently desires open relations with the rest of the world
community despite the strains that its actions at Tiananmen Square have placed on those
relations. See, e.g., Butler, Peking's Old Men Blind to World Horror at Killings, Fin.
Times (London), June 23, 1989, at 4, col. 6.
195. C. PARK, supra note 1, at 345-50.
196. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 31, at 600 (noting China and Japan agreed to joint
development in the Bohai Gulf); Valencia, supra note 2, at 40. China also suggested
solutions to its conflict with Taiwan, including the establishment of a joint development
zone. Id. at 56.
197. The Jan Mayen conciliation recommended use of a JDZ to settle a boundary
dispute between Iceland and Jan Mayen (Norway). Richardson, supra note 185, at 44849; see also Lee, supra note 31, at 600 (suggesting a JDZ between China and Japan).
Lee notes that two hurdles must be cleared before a JDZ is feasible in the East China
Sea: 1) the sovereignty dispute with Taiwan; and 2) the fact that China criticized the
Japan-Korea precedent for trying to resolve the issue without recognizing China's legitimate claims. Id. Also, Japan does not want to jeopardize its economic ties with Taiwan.
Id.
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litical and ideological rivalry need not necessarily stand in the way of
joint development.'" 8 Despite the positive support for joint development
zones (JDZs) they are not universally embraced. By their nature, JDZs
depend on cooperation and lack finality. 9 "
There exists an important theoretical precedent for the possibility that
a more receptive China could reach an alternative agreement in the situation off the coast of Australia. The geologic situation of Australia and
Timor closely resembles the geology of Japan and its western neighbors.
The Timor Sea, situated off the northern coast of Australia, is cut by
a significant submarine feature, the Timor Trough [that] continues the
line of the Sunda Trench, a deep submarine depression running parallel
to and south of the island arc ....

The Trough is situated between 30

and 60 [nautical miles] from Timor, over 200 [nautical miles] from the
200
Australian coast, and is up to 3,400 meters in depth.
The entire distance between the two states is less than four hundred
nautical miles. 20 ' Finally, geologists place Australia and Timor on separate, converging tectonic plates.20 2 "The distinctive topographic feature
resulting from ... convergence is a great oceanic trench often accompanied by a parallel island arc" like that in Australia-Timor and China20 3
Japan.

198. Richardson, supra note 185, at 451, 456. For an argument favoring this approach, see Valencia, supra note 2, at 57. China's execution of student demonstrators in
the summer of 1989 appears to have evoked a mixed reaction in Japan. See Weisman,
Tokyo Faults U.S. Sanctions For Chinese, N.Y. Times, June 22, 1989, at All, coL 1.
Japan suspended new economic aid to China but has taken care not to ostracize China.
Japanese businessmen, who began travelling on tourist visas to establish or maintain
business ties, drew government criticism. Id. While commentators predict a short-term
slowdown they do not foresee long term effects on China's relations with other countries.
See, e.g., Leninism and After, Fin. Times (London), June 22, 1989, at 26, col. 1. There
is already evidence that the slowdown will not be permanent. Kido, Japan Moving to
Normalize China Ties, 27 Japan Econ. J. 1378, at 1, col. 2 (weekly ed. Aug. 26, 1989);
cf. id. at 4, col. 4; Bruce & Riddell, Tough Sanctions on China Agreed, Fin. Times
(London), June 27, 1989, at 1, col. 3.
199. Cook, supra note 31, at 165.
200. Id. at 132.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 150-51. The only significant difference is that while Australia and Timor
are converging, China and Japan are diverging with the convergence of plates taking
place on the ocean side of Japan.
203. Id.; see J. KENNETT, supra note 17, at 355 (classifying both continental margins in a chart). The two situations are very similar insofar as the states making claims
are located on different continental blocks on either side of a subduction zone. The margin difference is that, in the case of the Ryukyus, it is the ocean on the far side that is
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Comparing the tectonics in the Japan-China and Australia-Timor regions.

subducting, while in the case of the Sunda Trench, the Australian continent is being
subducted. See Illustration 11 supra p. 611. Because the Okinawa Trough is more geologically complex than the Timor Trough, Japan could claim that any discontinuity between Japan and China is not quite as severe as that which exists between Australia and
Timor. Although both result from similar tectonic activity, the Okinawa Trough on the
continental side of the Ryukyu's is a spreading zone that results less directly from subduction than does the Timor Trough, that directly overlays its subduction zone. The
trench corresponding to the Timor Trough in the Ryukyus is the Ryukyu Trench on the
oceanic side of the islands. There is no trough corresponding to the Okinawa Trough in
the Timor regime. Recall that in Libya-Malta, the Court did not recognize that a rift or
spreading zone was a significant discontinuity, although technically such a zone does
represent the boundary between plates. See supra notes 112-15 and accompanying text.
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In 1973, Australia legislatively confirmed its 1953 claim to the entire
continental shelf off the Australian coast.20 4 In 1980, Indonesia claimed
claim
a two hundred nautical mile EEZ that overlapped the Australian
20 5
and created a situation similar to that in the East China Sea.

Illustration 14
Source: Cook, Filling the Gap-Delimiting the Australia-Indonesia Maritime Boundary,
10 AUSTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 131, 135 (1987)

Although the Australian situation involves fewer parties, some of the
same political considerations involved in the East China Sea dispute obtain there. Professor Cook points out that "[flight in the middle of the
gap in the agreed boundary, opposite East Timor, lies the Kelp Structure or Prospect [that] is estimated to contain oil reserves of between 500
million and 5 billion barrels."20 6 The relationship between Indonesia
(which controls the island of Timor) and Australia has historically been

204. Cook, supra note 31, at 133.
205. Id. at 134. The "agreed boundary line" approximately traces the Timor
Trough. Id.
206. Id. at 135. Other estimates confirm that at least fifty to 250 million barrels may
exist in this zone. Reid, supra note 39, at 553 (criticizing the higher estimates as
"irresponsible").
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tense. The two states, however, began talks once Australia recognized
Indonesian sovereignty over Timor in 1985.207
Professor Cook reached many of the same conclusions as this Note
when he analyzed the guidance international law provides to the boundary delimitation between Australia and Indonesia. Professor Cook found
that the LOSC gives little guidance on the topic and looked instead to
the decisions of international tribunals.20 8 He found that none of the
cases dealing with opposite coast delimitation set up a hard and fast
rule,2" 9 and he decided accordingly that the broadest possible conclusions
are that 1) the theory of natural prolongation is subordinate to equity;21 0

2) geographic considerations predominate in reaching an equitable solution;2 11 and 3) the evolution of the concept of the EEZ has further subordinated the theory of natural prolongation within two hundred nauti-

cal miles of a state's baseline.212 After analyzing the rules regarding
EEZ delimitation, Professor Cook also concluded that "[t]he search for
norms of international law on delimitation of the EEZ between adjacent
or opposite States is a frustrating and fruitless one." 2 13 Professor Cook
extended his analysis to include state practice in each of these areas and
found that in areas where no intervening plate boundary exists, states
tend to apportion their shelves by drawing a median line and, failing

that, by creating a JDZ.214 Additionally, he found that, in delimiting
EEZs, states tend to use a median line out of acquiescence, not

obligation.21 5
Because of the conflict between the continental shelf regime and the

principles of the EEZ, Professor Cook seeks, as others have sought, a
solution outside the traditional means of boundary delimitation. Com-

207. Reid, supra note 39, at 552.
208. Cook, supra note 31, at 155; see also Reid, supra note 39, at 547; Chiu, supra
note 151, at 16 ("The provisions on delimitation of the exclusive economic zone/continental shelf between states with opposite or adjacent coasts in the 1982 [UNCLOS] are
too general and therefore give rise to some difficult problems in their application to a
concrete case.").
209. Cook, supra note 31, at 160.
210. Chinese scholars feel this hierarchy is backwards. See Yuan, supra note 151, at
426.
211. Cook, supra note 31, at 147-48; see also Charney, supra note 35, at 520
("Non-geographic factors may be almost completely irrelevant in all cases of boundary
delimitations within 200 nautical miles from the coastline.").
212. Cook, supra note 31, at 160.
213. Id. at 163.
214. Id. at 153.
215. Id. at 162-63. A sense of legal obligation, or opinio juris, is necessary for the
formation of international law. HENKIN, supra note 24, at 37.
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mentators suggest a JDZ for the Australia-Timor Gap 216 and the states
2 17
have conducted talks on the subject.

Illustration 15
Source: 59 AUSTL. FOREIGN AFF. REC. 387 (1988). The illustration shows the agreement reached by
officials making proposals to the governments of Australia and Timor for resolution of the boundary
dispute.*
216. See, e.g., Reid, supra note 39, at 553. Reid suggests that this solution is supported by the LOSC and customary international law which, he declares, require states
to seek a good faith agreement on the division of common deposits of petroleum. Id. at
547-48.
217. See, e.g., Zone of Cooperation Proposedfor Timor Gap, 59 AUSTL. FOREIGN
Arr. REC. 387 (1988) [hereinafter Zone of Cooperation];Australia-IndonesiaRelations:
Officials' Talks on Maritime Borders, 57 AUSTL. FOREIGN AFF. REC. 566 (1986); Australia-IndonesiaRelations: Officials' Talks on Maritime Boundaries, 57 AUSTL. FOREIGN AFF. REC. 555 (1986). Australia initially proposed the idea of a joint authority for
administering the area. Valencia, Taming Troubled Waters: Joint Development of Oil
and Mineral Resources in Overlapping Claim Areas, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 661, 680-

81 (1986).
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Professor Cook dislikes this solution because it requires cooperation
and entails a lack of finality. He believes that such a solution creates a
potential for future conflict if relations sour between the states. He suggests instead an equal division of the overlap between the claims of the
21 8
two states.

Illustration 16
Modified from: 59 AusTL. FOREIGN AFF. REc. 387 (1988). The illustration
shows the line dividing the best claims made by each side.

218. Cook, supra note 31, at 166-68. Professor Cook believes that within the area
defined by an EEZ, the EEZ regime will eventually subsume the continental shelf regime in international law. Id. Australia and Indonesia recently agreed to try a solution
different than either of these two proposals. The agreed solution establishes a JDZ in the
area of overlap roughly between the median line and the Timor Trough. It gives the
areas outside this zone to the jurisdiction of the closest country. See Zone of Cooperation,
supra note 217.
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Professor Cook's solution, however, does not aid the development of
international boundary delimitation because it merely encourages maximalist claims and adds uncertainty to the process.219 Despite the identified shortcoming of Professor Cook's solution, either his proposal or a
JDZ could be made to work in the discrete situation of the East China
Sea. Professor Cook's solution seems especially apt, particularly in light
of the struggle between Taiwan and the People's Republic of China, as
22 0
well as the recent unrest in China.
Dr. Ying-jeou Ma has proposed a solution based on proportionality
that achieves a similar result. 2 1 Dr. Ma finds that a comparison of the
land to water ratio along the coast of the Ryukyu islands to the unbroken continental coast of China precludes finding broad equality between
the coasts.2 22 Dr. Ma believes that the land mass of the four main Japanese islands distinguishes that part of Japan from the Ryukyus to the
south. 2 3 Dr. Ma computes that this coastal difference favors China by a
ratio of approximately sixty-five to thirty-five. 224 He would use these
figures to "serve as a guideline to the range of proportions an equitable
delimitation ought to bring about.' 22' Treating the Japanese islands in
this manner 226 advantageously utilizes an established basis of delimita-

219. Charney Interview, supra note 130. Instead of encouraging development of a
principle that can be applied in non-judicial settings, Professor Cook's solution gives
parties an incentive to make extreme claims that will have to be factually verified and
then resolved by a third party. Cook, supra note 31, at 165-69.
220. The Taiwan-China "rivalry remains a major stumbling block to any peaceful
settlement of the Sino-Japanese sea-bed dispute in the East China Sea." Chao, supra
note 143, at 97. The advantage of Cook's suggestion is that it is easier for Taiwan and
the People's Republic of China to reach an accord because to do so does not presuppose
that either must lose the governmental dispute. Additionally, agreement does not presuppose an on going relationship between the two parties. Nonetheless, there is no incentive
for these two states to compromise their claims and to help Japan since they would
remain unable to develop the area until their own dispute is resolved. Overcoming this
obstacle requires ingenuity on the part of the Japanese, but they have great incentive for
ingenuity that may result in clear title to a part of the shelf from which they are presently at some risk of being excluded. On China's unrest, see supra note 198.
221. Y. MA, supra note 128, at 157-58.
222. Id. at 157. This conclusion is similar to the result achieved on the basis of an
analysis treating the Ryukyus as offshore dependent islands rather than as part of the
mainland. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
223. Y. MA, supra note 128, at 158.
224. Id. at 164, 259.
225. Id. at 164; cf.Cook, supra note 31, at 173 (considering the relation between the
Indonesian archipelago and the Australian mainland without taking account of proportionality concerns).
226. Cf Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 13,
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tion (proportionality), favoring China and others in this area, yet giving
Japan a stake in the oil reserves purportedly on the far side of the Okinawa Trough.
Japan may be able to seek one of the methods of cooperation in the
East China Sea as a means for securing its ability to continue its policy
of economic expansion.22 7 Such action also coincides with the general call
for Japan to take the international initiative; it accommodates the stated
Japanese ideal of harmonious relations within the Asian community; and
it allows Japan access to the area's oil.
VII.

CONCLUSIONS AND COMMENTS

The I.C.J. in the Gulf of Maine case stated that general international
law forbids unilateral boundary delimitation between adjacent or opposite states and requires that parties to a boundary dispute submit to dispute resolution if negotiations fail.22 8 Accordingly, the neighbors on the
East China Sea are obligated to work out a boundary or submit the
dispute to a third party; yet, fulfillment of this obligation still rests with
the parties. Whether they will be motivated to seek third party resolution
or to resolve the issue among themselves depends on a number of factors,
including 1) perceptions of the law such a body would apply; 2) economic need for the resources of the region; and 3) the relations between
the neighbors. Analysis of the situation suggests that the application of
the law is uncertain in the East China Sea primarily because that law
does not yet definitively address how to treat troughs like the Okinawa
Trough or islands like the Ryukyus. These uncertainties in turn stem
from uncertainty as to interpretation of "equity," the fundamental norm
of boundary delimitations. Analysis also suggests that many historical
problems that have prevented resolution of the dispute still exist, although some have recently abated allowing for a greater chance for resolution of this complex boundary dispute.
Even though the Libya-Malta case demonstrates that international
reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1197 (1984). But cf. supra note 171 and accompanying text.

China was silent as to this article in deference to Third World wishes. H. CHIu, CHINA
AND THE LAW OF THE SEA CONFERENCE 17 (University of Maryland School of Law,
Occasional Papers/Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian Studies No. 4-1981 (41),
1981).
227. See generally K. VAN WOLFEREN, THE ENIGMA OF JAPANESE POWER (1989)
(discussing the structure of the Japanese political system and finding that while there are
no Japanese political leaders in the traditional sense of the word there is nevertheless a

policy of continued economic expansion to which one can appeal).
228. Case Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine
Area (Can. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 246, 299, reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1197, 1224 (1984).
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tribunals are a viable means of dispute resolution for states of different
ideologies, that case does not offer enough security to recommend judicial
resolution by the I.C.J. as the best means of settling the boundary dispute in this case. The situation in the East China Sea is not as simple as
it was in Libya-Malta: more states are involved; some of the states have
no diplomatic relations with their neighbors; and resolution of the East
China Sea dispute could have political implications outside that area for
one major player-China. Still, the recent opening of China to foreign
joint ventures and the tentative first success of such a joint venture in the
Yellow Sea suggest that there is a possibility for agreement. If resource
management issues are solved independently, boundary lines in the region may be easier to draw and states may be more willing to submit to
an international tribunal. Recent trends in international law and the political climate in China suggest, although with recent cause for concern
relating to the student outbreak and the Chinese Government response
in Tiananmen Square, that Japan may have a greater chance to benefit
from pursuit of such a course of action than it had in the past.
Kendrick F. Royer*
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